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IN THE SGPRE:·:E COURT OF 11-iE STATE OF UTAH

- - - - - -- -..:.:.I

::x:

GI?SC'.'J l''.cLAUGHLIN

a:-.2 CE:~~HS BECKER,

Appellants,
-vs-

srA:E

Case No. 11305

CF UTAH'

Respondents.

BRIEF

OF

APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE

The appellants, William Gibson McLaughlin and Dennis
Becker, were convicted of the crime of willfully and
maliciously breaking into a coin box associated with a
Public telephone instrument in violation of Section 76-48-28

u.c.A., 195 3, as amended and appeal to this court from
their conviction.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

The appellants were charged by information of a
felony of willful and malicious damage to a public utility.

I'hey entered pleas of not guilty.

The defendants waived

their right to jury trial and the matter came on regularly
~:r

hc:a.::-ing before the Honorable c. Nelson Day, Judge of

t~.e District Court of the Fif1::.r1 _;,1,Jici'll

Washington County, State of Ut~ih.

Gi::;t.cict,

At the clo::;e of the

Both defendants were found guilty of th<:: off<::ns": ch"ir-:J"=:::i
and committed to the Utah State Prison.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal and remand for new trial.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
About 5:30 A.M. of the 8th of May, 1967, tv:o your.';)'
men were observed tampering with a telephone ne::r the

store of Mr. Quentin A. Nissan in Washington, Uta:1.

i'.::".

Nisson observed the incident from his bedroom window
approximately 68 feet from the booth.

He observed tv:o

young men, he testified, "one was dressed in blue and he
~s

completely in blue pants, that is, dark pants and

d~rk

shirt, was inside the booth and he was up to the telephone
working, not trying to phone, but in the act of trying to

get the telephone off, because I could see objects in his
hands", the other man was outside the phone booth and h3d
objects in his hands. (TR. 58-59).

A car was parked near

by and Mr. Nissan testified that the car was a dark C3~

With round tail lights, but he was unable to determine
''',2

color of the car or type of license plate; he did

-2-

telephone booth wis ar:-tificially illumin.:iled fr-om within
anJ the ::ire1 in the vicinity of the booth w:is lii]hted by

a str-cet light.
3pproxi:';1tely

~~.

r-1.r. Nissan made these observations in

one-half minute. (TR. 73).

Nissan notified the Highway Patrol of the incident

by calling the Utah Highway Patrol Station about two miles

from his home; while still in contact with the station on
the telephone, Mr. Nissan was informed that a car had been
stopped and was asked to go out to the place where the car
was stopped.

The car, occupied by Bonnie Jean Winget,

Barbara Galloway, William Gibson McLaughlin and Dennis
Pecker-, was stopped approximately one and a quarter miles
from the Nissan store.

When Mr. Nissan arrived at the

scene where the car was stopped, Officer Pfoutz had the
two men at gun point at the back of their car.

Mr. Nissan

identified the defendants as being the same two men he saw
in and around the telephone booth. (TR. 63).

Mr.

At trial,

Nissan identified the defendants as being the same

persons he had seen at the scene of the crime and later,
or.e and a quarter miles down the road at the point of
Officer Pfoutz gun. (TR. 65).
Officer Joseph A. Pfoutz, city policeman for the City
Jf St. George, put the defendants and their two women

-3-

St. George City Jail where they •,1•::re gi '1en thi::; i:.ir"l.nC3.

~liranda

warning they

requ~sted

an attorney:

(T2. ~S-37!

"Q.
Were all of the defendants present at t~.e
time you overhe0rd officer \'Thi tehead advise t~:e::-t
of their rights?

A.

Yes, sir, I believe so, yes, sir.

Q.

What happened next?

A.

The two gentlemen indicated that they didn't--

MR. PICKETT:
Just a minute. We object to
any indication or interpretation, any indic2tions.
Q.

(By Mr. Burns)

State what you did.

THE COURT:
Mr. Witness, when you say they
indicated, why, that's your conclusion as to what
they did. You may state the substance of what t'.-'.ey
said. No one will expect you to remember their
exact language at this time, unless it was taken
down electronically or like the Court Reporter is
doing it now; but you may state in substance what
was said, if you remember.
THE WITNESS:
They said that--didn't say a
heck of a lot. They did want an attorney.
MR. PICKETT:
Now, just a minute, your Honor,
when they sdy there are four of them, we would like
to know-MR. BURNS:
May I wi thdra1v the question,
your Honor? I withdraw the last question and will
move forward in a different area.
THE COURT:

His answer mav stand that thev
-4-

SLl~.;:1~~c

of

~h3t

:-:.-;:'.3

he W3S

~r.e

(frt::tU3lS ,3dded)

Cn er·
o::ur-rt:~

al'out the 18th of Hiy, 1967, an incidPnt

in the Washington County Juil, St. Vc:or<:;e, Utah,

w"e:t' ::'·e Jefendants, McLaughlin and Becker, were incarccratc:l 1,·:;i ting trial.

According to the tes tk,ony of

Officer Joseph A. Pfoutz, defendant McLaughlin made an
a~ission

against his own interest; to the effect that

they hadn't broken into the box maliciously, they had
.dor.e
the

it for money.

decl2rer1t to be William Git., )n McLaughlin, though

~. ~~l2u;~lin

;1~1

Officer Joseph A. Pfoutz identified

was located in a different room of the

and could not be seen by Mr. Pfoutz at the time the

stater.ent was heard.

(TR. 99-102).

Testimony of Officer

Pfoutz is set forth below:
"Q.

Now, state what happened.

A.
Mr. Becker was awake when I went into
the jail. He asked me if I had a cigarette.
I opened the main door, walked back into the
section, handed him a cigarette.
Q.

What happened, then?

A.
I walked back outside and locked the door,
picked up a piece of paper that was on a table
in the room there.
Q.
A.

What happened next?
Becker spoke up. Apparently he had
':he took out there, thrown the book out
a pocket bo o k • He asked or told me that
-5-

~~.

if I had picked up that tssk, t~it it w::=n't
any good, tlic-1t he h::iri alrc,::dy u:,-id th~ book
and it wasn't worth ~~adir.1.
Q.

Whcit did you say?

I told him that I hadn't picked up the
book, that I h;:id picked up the cor'.[)l;c;ir.t eir.d
the warrant thr:it had been sworn out ag-:iinst
them.

A.

Q.

And what did he say?

A.

He said--! don't renember exactly.

O.
As near as you can recall, what did
Dennis Becker say?
A. He asked me what it said. I am not positive
on this. He asked me what it said and I began
to read it out loud.

Q.

MR. PICKETT:

The book or the conplaint?

THE WITNESS:

Pardon me.

MR. PICKETT:

The book or the complaint?

THE WITNESS:

The complaint.

(By Mr. Burns)

What did he say?

A.
I was reading and I just got started, and
as I got to the part, "Did willfully and rn:iliciously break into a coin box," Mr. McLaughlin
spoke up and stated that they hadn't broken ~ -1 to
this box maliciously. They had done it for
money.
Q.

Could you distinguish their voices?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Had you talked to them before?

A.

Yes, sir.
-6-

Q.
And you recognized the voice saying
they h'-ld done it for money as that of William
Gibson McLaughlin, is that correct?
A.

Yes, sir.

MR. BURNS:
this witness."

I have nothing further of

Defendant Dennis Becker was in the portion of the jail
referred to as the tank with defendant McLaughlin when
the statement to the effect that they had done it for
money was made by defendant McLaughlin; Becker did not
deny the assertion or make any other comment about
McLaughlin's statement.

(TR. 99).
POINT I

THE ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE OF THE FACT THAT
THE DEFENDANTS ASKED FOR AN ATTORNEY AFTER
BEING GIVEN A PRE-INTERROGATION WARNING WAS
AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL DEPRIVATION OF DUE PROCESS.
Officer Joseph A. Pfoutz testified that the defendant
Dennis Becker and defendant William Gibson McLaughlin were
given a pre-interrogation warning and in response to that
warning they requested an attorney.

The law is clear

that tacit admissions either by remaining silent in the
fact of accusation or requesting an attorney in the face
of accusation cannot be used against the defendant as a
means of penalizing a defendant for exercising his Fifth
A~enr:Jrn.ent privilege.

Dennis Becker and William McLaughlin

',:~re coxercising their Fifth Amendment privilege when they

-7-

the testimony of Officer Pfoutz,

thcit d<'~fendcints requ-=-sted

an attorney, the defc:nd,'l.nts' con:~titution;il ri']ht:; w::r•:

violated.
In United State·::; v. Brierly, 267 F. Supp. 274 (E.D.

Pa., 1967), held that a tacit admission is involunt0ry
~ ~ and its use is thus barred by the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The court st:=:.ted,

"we think that neither this Circuit nor the Suprer..e Court
. would sustain the validity of a tacit admission as evidence
in any criminal proceeding, •

In Gamble v. State,

. ."

210 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 1968),

the court reached the same conclusion:

"In view of the Miranda case it would not be
permissible to penalize a defendant for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when he
was under police custodial interrogation by
permitting the prosecution to use at trial
the fact that he remained silent in the face
of an accusation."
Clearly an expression of a desire to have an attorney
is a Fifth Amendment privilege of equal weight and should

not be used by the prosecutor for the purpose of creating

a negative inference of guilt.
The fact that testimony was given to the effect that
d~fendants,

Becker and McLau::ihlin, requested an attorney

'•:is a denial of their constitutional right to a fair trial

-8-

anJ a Cc'nL1l of due process of the law.

Further, the

t:-ial com:t expressly indicuted the testimony could remuin

in evi,ic'!1c:e in spite of defense objection.

Thus the court

appJrently weighed its judgment on the erroneous evidence.
Introduction of such testimony is prejudicial and results
in an unfair trial because it reflects upon the question
of guilt of the defendants.

Clearly there can be an infer-

ence of guilt when an individual requests an attorney after
receiving a pre-interrogation warning since some would
conclude, no matter how erroneously, that only a guilty
person would feel that he might make incriminating statements without the aid of an attorney.
~'

384

u.s.

Miranda

Vo

State of

436, 1602, (1966), closes the door to the

•admissibility of such testimony.

Footnote thirty-seven of

the Court's opinion in Miranda states:

"In accord with our decision today, it is
impermissible to penalize an individual
for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege
when he is under police custodial interrogation. The prosecution may not, therefore,
use at trial the fact that he stood mute or
claimed his privilege in the face of accusation."
See also Griffin v. California, 380 U.So 609 (1965);
~~an v. California, 386 U.S. 609 (1967).

People v. H;insard,, 53 Ca.Jo Rptr. 918 (1966) supports
t:.i:;

vi<.:·110

In that case an officer was allowed to testify

-9-

stated th0t he th0u'Jht h~ h~d bett~r talk to

~fendant

his attorney before st;-itin'J anythin'J furt:--,er,

by silence when the defendant

vJC1s

tr,e c 0 1.irt

ezercisin'J his core::: ti tu-

tional right under People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 333, 42
Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361 (1965).

In the

H-:i.r,s~.-:-d

case,

supra, the court said, "The accused's con.stitution-:i.l right
to remain silent and to consult with an attorney cannot

.. .

be exploited to his disadvantage by conversion into an

inference of guilty consciousness

"

Since the prosecution had no intention of introducing
statements obtained as a result of interrogation of the
' defendants, the circumstances under which the testimony
that the defendants requested an attorney was introduced
must have been to demonstrate the resulting inference
of consciousness of guilt.

In the Hansard case, supra,

the court found that admission of testimony to the effect
that defendant thought he had better talk to an attorney
strictly for the purpose of suggesting to the jury an
indication of defendant's consciousness of guilt was
erroneous.
'·
Pf rtions

Since the error was of constitutional pro-

· d un 1 ess 1·t can be said that
reversal is require

the error was harmless "beyond a reasonable doubt."

-10-

wr.tr1 the facts in this case are examined against the proper
sloti,1~1rd it is clear upon the record that admission of the

st3 ten:ent that defendants requc:.ted un attorney after
being given a pre-interrogation wo.rnlng wus a pre judicial
error requiring a new trial.

The evidence absent intro-

duction of this testimony is insufficient to obtain a
.conviction of either one or both of' the defendants.

The

evidence against defendants Becker and ri'cLaughlin is
meager.

Hr. Nissan's identification is questionable.

He

,wcs sixty-eight feet away from the phone booth when he

'observed one man tampering with the phone, and one outside
holding an object, he only observed their activity for
about thirty seconds, he was unable to recognize the color
'of the car or even the origin or color of its license
I

plate, it was dark outside except for the artificial
illumination of the phone booth and a street light, and

'yet he testified that he recognized the defendants in
w1rt as being the defendants he saw tampering with the
phone.

It is much more likely that Mr. Nisson recognized

·the defendants Becker and McLaughlin because they were

the same persons he observed at the point of Officer Pfoutz

gun.

It is very likely that Mr. Nisson converted the

- ir.~rirninating factors of observing the defendants, Becker
arid McLau1hlin, at the point of Officer Pfoutz gun, a mile
-11-

psitive idcr1tificc1tion of the lv10 youncJ r:en.

It "'""::, too

identify a p'C'rson or per::;ons at a distance of sixt;-ei-:;1-it

feet under id en tic al 1 igh tin'] conditions.
Another factor this court must consider in determining whei-_

c the error of ack,itting this testiriony in,

wos pre judicial, is whether the trial judge considered

this evidence in deciding the guilt of the defendants.
The record shows that the trial judge did consicer this

evidence significant since he allowed into evidence the
testimony of Officer Pfoutz even after the question had
been withdrawn.

(TR. 97).

Since it is evident from the record that the trial
judge considered the testimony of Officer Pfoutz that
defendants requested an attorney and since the other
evidence against the defendants was somewhat weak it
cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
did not affect the trial court's judgmento
POINT II
INTRODUCTION INTO EVIDENCE OF AN ADMISSION
OF DEFENDANT, WILLIA!'-! GIBSON McLAUGHLIN,
WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR AS TO DENNIS BECKER

-12-

A..';O A VI(>LATIC, OF' f!IS COii'..Jl'IrUTIO~JAL RIGHT
TO co;a•'t{Oi:':i.'ATIOiJ A:rn \·!AS Ff\E.JUDICIAL EWWR.

Officer· Joseph A. Pfoutz testified that on the

tr.ey h·Lln' t committed the offen.:;e m:iliciously, they had
c0c,1:i t: te'.:l it for money.

It was prejudicial error to allow

this testimony into evidence against both defendants for
l110

reasons.

First, the United States Supreme Court

established the rule applicable to this case in Bruton v.

Uhlted States, 88 So Ct. 1620 (1968).

In that case the

court held that oral statements made by one defendant
11hi:h incriminated both defendants were admissible as
;n exc-c:ption to the hearsay rule as against the defendant

;,3king the statement but could not be used against his
co-defendant.

The court held that "admission of Evans'

confession in ~-a _7 joint trial violated /Bruton' ~7right

of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause
of the Sixth Amendment."

Even though the Bruton case

was a jury tried case, the policy used in that case is

opplicable in this case.

To demonstrate the strength

of the desire to protect an indi viducil 's right to the
~rotection of the confrontation clause, it should be

rcint "d out that the Supreme Court of the United States
~-ur.'j prejudicial error even though the trial court gave

-13-

Jr>Jr, C'Jnci::;e and W1d·~r:::tc:tr.'~'Ll<:! ir..::;~1z:tion that tr,e
confe::;sion could only br" u::;•:d '-''}~1:ri:;t the declCirant and
~ust b 0

di::;re']''lrdr_:d v1ith

r<:'::;[)•:ct

~,, t!-.e d•,clar"lnt'::; CG-

d~fcr1ddnto

It may be argued th21t the 8r J'=0r, decision should not
1

apply since Dennis Becker wc:is in the sa;:,e roon as the
declarant, William G. McLaughlin, when the adI .ission was
0

made, and Dennis Becker did not object or deny the aC.."'.'ission.
lliis is the second basis of error.
on this point.

The Utah law is clear

In State v. Farnsworth, 14 Utah 2d 303,

383 P.2d 489 (1963), this court found prejudicial error

where the trial court admitted testimony of an alleged
accomplice's brother who occupied cell with defend:int,
• that in presence of defendant, the accomplice told his
brother that they could only be charged with receiving
and the defendant remained silent.

The facts of the

Farnsworth case and those currently before the Court
are virtually identical and the instant case is indistinguishable from Farnswortho

Therefore, though Dennis

Becker was in the same room as William Gibson McLaughlin,
Becker's failure to deny the incriminatory statenent of
his co-defendant could not be used against him as a
tacit admission.

-14-

Thi::; is not a harsh or w--.u.:::u :.:1 turden to place on
the St0 tt'.•
5t 3

Under: tradi tion.:il rule::; of evidence the hearsay

tcrncnt inculp.:tting Dermis Becker is clearly inadmissible.

~: 1 rrc

is no recognized exception to tr.e hearsay rule insofar

as Dennis Fe,~ker is concerned and tr.erefore any violation

of the hears0y rule raises questions under the Confrontation

Clause.

A defendant's constitutional right to be confronted

with the witnesses against him includes the right to crossexamine those witnesses; this right is a fundamental right
and is made obligatory on the states by the Fourteenth

Mendment.

See Pointer v. State of

~exas,

380 U.S. 400,

In the present case, it is obvious that William

(1965).

l·:cLaughlin' s statement of May 18, 196 7, that they "hadn't
. done it maliciously they had done it for money," was a
substantial admission.

To the extent it was used by the

uial court against Becker, his constitutional rights
were violated as well as prejudicial error committed under
Prior case law of this State.

Reversal as to Becker is

required.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's apparent consideration of the
e<idencf=>, that the appellants upon being given the Miranda
1:

0 rning

lrial.

requested counsel, requires reversal and a new
Ch0.prnan v. California, supra.
_, 'i-

This court should reverse.
Respectfully su'crr1itted,

RONALD N. BOYCE
Salt Lake County Bar
Legal Services, Inc.
431 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellants

